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THE CITY OF PIGS : A KEY PASSAGE IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC
Christopher Rowe
Durham University
Résumé. Le passage, au livre II de la République, décrivant ce que Glaucon, un des 
principaux interlocuteurs de Socrate, considère avec dédain comme une cité seule-
ment digne de porcs, est en réalité central dans la stratégie globale de Platon. Le 
Socrate de Platon nomme de fait cette cité la cité «  véritable  » et «  saine  », et 
cela est vrai pour Platon comme pour Socrate – ce que démontre le présent article. 
La « belle cité », Callipolis, que Socrate souhaite ériger dans la suite de la Répu-
blique, est donc par conséquent une cité moins « véritable », et les développements 
concernant l  ’âme et la justice qui se fondent sur elle (au livre IV) sont, de même, 
des développements qui n’embrassent pas la vérité de l’âme ni de la justice. Dans 
leur nature vraie et essentielle, ni la cité ni l  ’âme ne sont divisées en parties, que 
ces parties s’opposent ou coopèrent ; et la justice non plus ne peut être absolument 
déinie, au sens de sa nature véritable, en termes de coopération entre les parties 
d’une âme divisée. Si nous regardons rétrospectivement l’ensemble de la démons-
tration à partir du livre X, le dernier de la République, tous ces éléments semblent 
être anticipés dans la description de la «  cité des porcs  » et sa suite immédiate.
Summary. he passage in Book II of the Republic describing what Glaucon, one of 
Socrates’ main interlocutors, dismisses as a city it only for pigs is in fact central for Plato’s 
strategy in the dialogue as a whole. Plato’s Socrates actually calls this city the ‘true’ and 
‘healthy’ city, and so, the essay argues, it is, for Plato as well as for Socrates. he ‘beautiful 
city’, Callipolis, that Socrates goes on to construct in much of the rest of the Republic is, 
by implication, less than a ‘true’ city, and the accounts of the soul and of justice that come 
to be based on it (i.e., in Book IV) are, equally, not accounts of the soul, or of justice, 
as they truly are. In its true and essential nature neither city nor soul is divided into 
parts, whether conlicting or cooperating, and neither therefore can justice ultimately 
be deined, i.e., in its true nature, in terms of cooperation between parts of a divided 
soul. As we look back rom Book X, the inal book of the Republic, all of these points can 
be seen to be preigured in the description of the ‘city of pigs’ and its immediate sequel.

‘City of pigs’ is not the description Plato’s Socrates gives to the irst city he 
sketches in Book II of the Republic.1 Rather, it is Glaucon’s description, one 
that Socrates shows no sign whatsoever of endorsing,2 although he can reaso-
nably be said to provoke it by what he says about the diet and the lifestyle 
of the inhabitants of the city. Both diet and lifestyle would be simple: the 
citizens would work during the day, then feast in the evening, ‘serving up 
noble cakes and loaves on mats of reeds or freshly washed leaves, reclining on 
palliasses strewn with yew and myrtle … drinking their wine with garlands on 
their heads and hymns to the gods’,3 and so on. Glaucon objects that the feast 
is ‘a bit lacking in sauce’.4 To which Socrates responds
True… I forgot that they’ll have their sauce too, and obviously things like salt 
and olives and cheese; and yes, they’ll do as people do in the countryside, and 
boil up onions and greens. And I imagine we’ll provide them with desserts of 
igs and chickpeas and beans, and they’ll roast myrtle berries and acorns on 
the ire to a moderate accompaniment of wine…5
he mention of acorns is enough by itself to spark of Glaucon’s imme-
diate retort: ‘Socrates, suppose you were putting together a city of pigs: 
would the fodder you’d provide for them be any diferent from this?’ So 
1. R. II, 369a-372d. Outline sketches of the ideas to be argued for in the present essay 
appeared in Rowe 2007a and ch. 5 of Rowe 2007b; see also Rowe forthcoming, in which 
I argue that the so-called ‘city of pigs’ could well have served as a model for the Politeiai of 
Diogenes and of Zeno, and make a detailed case against those who suppose, whether explicitly 
or implicitly, that Socrates’ own praise for this city is not to be taken seriously.
2. In fact he plainly rejects it: see 372e2-373a7, quoted in full below.
3. 372b3-7. he translations of all Republic passages in this essay are taken from Rowe 2012.
4. c3.
5. c5-d2. he provocation to Glaucon here is clear enough: any resemblance to Mother 
Teresa on Socrates’ part is strictly limited, and limited to this context (neither Plato’s Socrates 
nor the real one evidently went in for so restricted a diet, or for reclining on palliasses and 
eating of reeds or leaves instead of properly equipped tables). 
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how, Socrates asks, should he treat the inhabitants of his city? ‘Just in the 
usual way,’ replies Glaucon; ‘anyone who wasn’t going to be in discomfort, I 
imagine, would have couches to recline on, tables to dine from, all the sauces 
and desserts they have now.’6
Fine [Socrates replies]; I see what you’re saying. Evidently we’re not just 
looking into how a city comes into being, but how a luxurious (truphosa) city 
does so. Well, perhaps that’s no bad thing; perhaps by looking at this kind of 
city, too,7 we’ll be able to observe how justice and injustice take root in cities. 
Now, I myself think the true city to be the one we were describing just now – 
a healthy kind of city, one might say. But if the two of you want us to examine 
not just this city, but one that’s in the grip of a fever, there’s nothing to stop 
us doing that. It appears that there are some people who won’t be satisied 
with what we’ve ofered so far, and with the kind of lifestyle we’ve proposed: 
there’ll have to be couches, tables and other furniture, sauces too, perfumes, 
incense, prostitutes and pastries, all of them in every variety available. he 
things we were talking about before, basic necessities like houses, cloaks and 
shoes, are no longer enough; no, we’re to start painting and embroidering, 
and to get ourselves some gold and ivory and everything like that.8
So far from being it only for pigs, then, to Socrates his imagined city is 
the ‘true’, ‘healthy’ human city; the lifestyle he has sketched is one that we, as 
humans, should be satisied with, and the sort of city Glaucon has in mind, 
the ‘usual’ or conventional sort,9 is one that he, Socrates, regards, and by 
implication we should regard, as sick (‘in the grip of a fever’), and in need of 
6. d5-e1.
7. his ‘too’ (kai toiauten, sc. polin) is sometimes not noticed: Lee 1987, e.g., omits it, as 
does Grube as edited by Reeve (= Grube & Reeve 1997), and the usually unswervingly reliable 
Shorey, in Shorey 1935. Waterield, in Waterield 1993, notices the kai but misinterprets it, 
as Tom Gri th probably also does, in Ferrari & Gri th 2000: ‘if we look at that sort of city 
too, we may perhaps see the point where justice and injustice come into existence …’– as if 
Socrates supposes they can only see it by looking at the new sort of city, when actually he and 
Adimantus had already been looking to see ‘how justice and injustice take root’ in the case of 
another city, namely the ‘city of pigs’. Socrates had not only raised the same question (albeit 
with a diferent verb), in relation to this latter city, at 371e11-12 (in accordance with the 
strategy proposed in 368e-369b), but had begun answering it, with Adimantus, in 372a, and 
was answering it until Glaucon’s intervention. his is of crucial importance: see further below. 
( Justice and injustice, in 371e11-12, are interestingly fused into a single feminine subject, as if 
to mark the fact – missed in Rowe 2007b, p.168-169 – that if one inds the irst, ipso facto one 
will have found the second too.) Of course the switch to Glaucon’s ‘luxurious’ city is required 
for the discovery of the Book IV deinitions of justice in city and soul, but as Socrates will tell 
us himself (IV, 435c-d; VII, 504b), the Book IV approach does not give us the most precise 
or the inest view on justice. One of the chief points of the present essay will be to argue that 
the ‘city of pigs’ passage hides another view on the subject: one that Socrates prefers, just as he 
prefers the city Glaucon caricatures as ‘piggish’.
8. 372e2-373a7.
9. ‘So how should I be treating [the inhabitants of my city], Glaucon?’ ‘Just in the usual 
way (haper nomizetai).’ (372d7-8)
he Key Passage of the City of Pigs in Plato’s Republic                      59 
a cure. he cure he will go on to suggest is, of course, the imposition of philo-
sophical rule, and all the supporting structures and institutions of Callipolis.
It is widely pointed out, and plain in any case, that this ‘cure’ cannot be 
said to take us back to the conditions of the original city – let us call it ‘the 
irst city’. his irst city appears not to have, or to need, any rulers, philo-
sophical or otherwise, or guards doubling as army and police, or indeed 
any hierarchy at all apart from what is implied by the division between the 
citizens proper and such labourers as would need to be hired to provide the 
brawn required to supplement citizen brains and expertise.10 In this case, it 
begins to look as if the purpose of the irst city has been exhausted once it has 
fulilled its function of identifying the basic building blocks of a city.11 But if 
that were to be the whole story, and Plato had no further use for this irst city, 
it would leave us with a signiicant problem: if this city was always intended 
simply to disappear from the scene in favour of Callipolis, why would Plato 
have Socrates praise it to the skies, in the way that he does? It would surely be 
odd to prefer a city that has been restored to health from an unhealthy, feve-
rish condition (‘one that’s in a feverish condition’) over one that was, and 
stayed, healthy, especially when being ‘restored to health’ in the case of the 
former will apparently still leave it short of the bonny and unchanging health 
of the latter. It seems that there is more than enough justiication for asking 
again, as I propose to do in this essay, exactly what role this city ‘of pigs’ plays 
in the overall argument of the Republic.12 
*
hat he not only favours this ‘piggish’, non-luxurious city, but favours it in 
emphatic terms, suggests that it ought not to fall out of that overall argument 
altogether.13 Nor in fact does Socrates forget it. Twenty-seven Stephanus 
pages later, he refers back directly to the very passage in which he contrasted 
Glaucon’s preferred option with his own.14  In the course of the discussion 
of the musical and cultural education of the military class, from whom the 
rulers will ultimately be selected, Socrates at one point suggests that they 
have actually, without noticing, been giving ‘what they were just now calling 
10. 371d-e.
11. See II, 569a.
12. he question was raised more than once during the session of the Société Française de 
Philosophie on 22 November 2014, led by Michel Narcy: see Narcy 2014. he present paper 
is a response, invited by M. Narcy, to the discussion at that session.
13.  I.e., as ‘piggish’ and lacking the luxuries Glaucon expects. If Socrates had used it 
merely as a way to introduce the basic requirements of a city, it would have been no surprise if 
he failed to mention it explicitly again; it is the fact that he says it is his preferred city (lifestyle 
and all) that would make its disappearance from the argument problematic.
14. I.e., at II, 372e2-373a7.
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a luxurious city’15 a proper cleansing or puriication (diakathairein). his 
refers in the irst instance to the measure he and Glaucon have just agreed to, 
outlawing any musical instruments other than the (allegedly ‘purer’) lyre and 
cithara, with panpipes for rustics.16 He then follows this suggestion, however, 
by proposing that they should ‘go on and clean up (‘purify’, kathairein) the 
bits that are let’ (ta loipa); and while these ‘bits that are let’ are, immediately, 
other aspects of music, the proposal can also be taken more broadly, that is, 
as signalling Socrates’ intention that Callipolis as a whole should ultimately 
be as ‘clean’ as possible. Since a ‘luxurious’ city was originally also conceived 
of as a sick, ‘feverish’ one, ‘cleansing’ it will presumably also be a matter of 
curing it of its fever; and since it was ‘feverish’ by comparison with the irst, 
‘piggish’, city, it is also reasonable to suppose that ‘cleansing’ and ‘curing’ it 
so far as possible will amount to making it as like to that irst city as possible. 
It cannot be completely cleansed or cured, and so actually become that irst 
city; it will still be host to the ‘luxuries’ that make it ‘feverish’, even if they are 
denied to the guards and rulers. To that extent it must always be a sick rather 
than a truly healthy city. But that is why it needs guards, and rulers – and 
especially philosophical rulers,17 insofar as it is philosophy that will provide 
the insight required for the maintenance of the city’s institutions: the main-
tenance, above all, of its educational system, which produces guards immune 
to the allure of gold, silver, and the rest, so rendering them saviours both of 
themselves and of the city.18 In short, it seems that Callipolis is as close as 
it can be to Socrates’ irst city as it can be while complying with Glaucon’s 
requirement that it have all the ‘comforts’19 he thinks inseparable from the 
idea of a city. 
here are two prima facie objections to this interpretation. he irst of 
these is that, surely, ‘as close as possible’ will not be close at all, given that 
the Callipolitan hierarchy, which the Socratic city lacks, is actually Calli-
polis’ most distinctive feature. he second and (apparently) just as obvious 
objection is that the educational programme that seems to do the heavy 
liting with the ‘cleansing’ or ‘puriication’ of the second city20 is speciically 
designed for the guards, and the eventual rulers, not for the population at 
large; the majority of the citizens will, by implication, be let to their own 
devices, and to the pleasures and luxuries denied to the ruling and military 
classes. So the cleansing is not of the city, just of one sub-group, among the 
15. 399e5 : hen arti truphan ephamen polin.
16. III, 399d-e.
17. V, 473c-e.
18. III, 417a6.
19. I.e., those things that allegedly contribute to the absence of talaiporia for a person: 
II, 372d9.
20. I.e., the city that immediately succeeds the ‘city of pigs’, prior to its ‘cleansing’.
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citizens, however important a sub-group it may be.
Both of these objections, however, can readily be met. In response to the 
irst, we should notice that while Callipolis looks, and is, very diferent from 
Socrates’ irst city, it also shares with it what is – from the perspective of 
the overall argument of Books II-IV, and of its main purpose of providing 
an account of justice – the single most important feature of all. he justice 
of Callipolis will turn out to be a matter of ‘each single individual’s doing 
the job that is his, and not meddling in what should be done by others’. So 
Socrates will propose,21 and Glaucon will agree. But the irst city actually 
starts from a version of this principle.22 It is also in the course of the irst 
city passage that Socrates establishes and justiies the principle itself 23 (thus 
making the passage foundational for the rest of II-IV). he description 
of the irst city even comes within a whisker of anticipating the Book IV 
account of justice in the city, by identifying it, as Book IV does, with the 
idea ‘one citizen, one job’ itself.24 In short, until it is rudely interrupted by 
Glaucon’s objection, that Socrates is treating the city’s inhabitants no better 
21. IV, 433d3-4.
22. 369b7-c3:  ‘Cities come into existence, I imagine, because in fact none of us is self-
suicient; taken by ourselves, each one of us is deicient in many respects… hus it will be 
because one person recruits another to ill this or that need, and another another, and so 
on, and because our needs are many, that we gather many people together to live in a single 
location as partners and helpers, calling this shared habitation a “city”’ (with a pun on polloi/
polis).
23. ‘hen one person shares something with another, if he does, or takes his share from 
another, because he thinks doing so is better for himself ?’ (369c6-7) It will be better if 
functions are distributed between diferent people, because (a) ‘each of us is not born exactly 
like everybody else, but with diferent natural capacities’ (370b1-2); (b) any individual will 
be ‘more efective [i.e., get more done?] when he … conines himself to one area’ rather than 
spreading himself over more than one (b5-7); (c) he will also be better able to catch the right 
moment (b11-c2). 
24. his is in 371e11 f.: ‘So where on earth shall we ind [the city’s] justice or injustice? 
Of those aspects of it that we’ve examined, which is the one it will have originated with?’ 
‘I can’t think, Socrates,’ said Adimantus, ‘unless perhaps it’s to be found somehow in the 
mutual need all these categories of people have for each other.’ ‘Perhaps you’re right,’ I said; 
‘we must look and see at once – no holding back. So irst of all let’s see how our people will 
occupy their time, now that they’re provided for in the way we’ve described – presumably 
they’ll spend their time producing food, wine, cloaks and shoes. hey’ll build houses, and 
in summer they’ll work away mostly naked and shoeless, while in the winter they’ll wear 
whatever clothes and shoes they need to protect them.’ (hen follows the description of the 
inhabitants’ eating, sleeping and leisure arrangements that provokes Glaucon into his refe-
rence to pigs, which causes Socrates to break of his proposed examination of Adimantus’ 
suggestion. On the interpretation I propose, without Glaucon’s intervention Socrates could 
have moved directly to an account of justice in the city in terms of the formula ‘one citizen, 
one job’, although with no hierarchical divisions among the relevant inhabitants of the irst 
city such an account would have looked very diferent from the account ultimately reached in 
Book IV, as would any analogical account of justice in the soul: see below.)
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than pigs, it seems that the description of the irst city is itself well on the 
way to illing the role that will ultimately be illed by its far longer sequel, the 
account of the ‘City Beautiful’, Callipolis. If so, then the puzzle is no longer 
about the function of the irst city in the overall argument, but rather about 
the function, in that argument, of Callipolis itself: why does Socrates/Plato 
shit the search for justice from the irst city to the much larger and more 
complex construction represented by Callipolis? And this new25 puzzle is 
all the greater for the fact that the distinctive hierarchical structure of Calli-
polis at least initially derives from the introduction of luxuries that a city, 
on Socrates’ account, not only can perfectly well do without but is seriously 
harmed (rendered ‘feverish’) by admitting. Allowing for the ‘sauce’ Glaucon 
wants added to the life of the city means vastly increased numbers of inha-
bitants, so a larger territory, so an army26 – the guards, who according to the 
founding principle necessarily constitute a separate group of people – and so 
also a ruling class equipped to ensure that the whole city, and especially the 
educational system, continues in the right direction.27  Looked at in this way, 
the hierarchical structure of Callipolis is required precisely in order to allow 
it to approximate to the simplicity and unity of Socrates’ original city.
his is made even clearer by the obvious response to the second of the 
two objections raised above, namely that the process of ‘cleansing’ extends 
only to the guards, not to the rest of the population (and so not to the city 
as a whole, as I supposed28). Why, one may ask, should this matter? Why 
should we presume that the citizens of Callipolis other than the rulers and 
the guards – i.e., mostly, those involved in seeing to the city’s material needs 
– will turn to pleasure and luxury? he underlying principle of the City 
Beautiful is that ‘each individual should practice the single role to which his 
nature is most suited, among those relevant to the city’,29 and this, as Socrates 
makes clear, will rule out anything that interferes with that role. He chooses 
25.  ‘New’, at any rate, in terms of the argument of the present essay. Many modern 
interpreters have been inclined to regard the shit in question as a matter of Plato’s (and his 
Socrates’) moving on from a sort of impossible, rustic dream – one that even Socrates (surely!) 
cannot take seriously! – to hard analysis. Such interpreters have failed to discern the core 
point that hides beneath Socrates’ provocation to Glaucon and his like, and is not withdrawn 
at any point: that the very luxuries they take for granted make a city, and by implication its 
citizens, unhealthy and in need of a ‘cure’.
26. II, 373a-374a.
27. As Republic V shows, Plato thinks philosophical rule justiied and necessary in any 
case (that is, apart from any special reasons deriving from the context of the argument of 
the Republic itself ). But as we can see from the Statesman and the Laws, government by 
philosophers need not mean making kings and queens into philosophers; it can also be 
realized in the form of a philosophical adviser, or philosophical legislators.
28. See my comments, above, on ta loipa at III, 399e7.
29.  III, 433a5-6 (this is ‘what we laid down, I believe, and frequently asserted, if you 
recall’, a4).
he Key Passage of the City of Pigs in Plato’s Republic                      63 
to express this point by reference to the very sort of luxuries that are denied 
to the rulers and guards, and that Glaucon thought ‘usual’ – the sort that 
Adimantus too thinks are needed to make people happy. Adimantus has 
claimed that Socrates is depriving the guards of everything that ‘is thought 
(nomizetai) to be required for happiness’,30 like gold and silver; to which 
Socrates replies that
you shouldn’t force us to attach a kind of happiness to the guards that will 
make them anything but guards. We could if we wanted give our farmers 
the same treatment – dress them up in elaborate robes, put gold round 
their necks and tell them to work the land when they felt like it. We could 
have the potters reclining on couches, let to right before the ire, drinking 
and feasting to their hearts’ content, their wheels to one side to use just so 
much as they wish. We could give everybody else the same sorts of blessings, 
and make the whole city happy that way. But don’t advise us to adopt that 
course, because if we do as you say, farmers won’t be farmers, potters won’t 
be potters, and in general all those types needed to make up a city will tend 
to merge into one another. Now if this happens with most of them it doesn’t 
matter so much: if shoe-stitchers are corrupted and turn bad, so that they 
only pretend to be good at stitching shoes, a city31 has nothing to fear from 
that. But if those who guard the laws and the city are not what they seem to 
be, you see for yourself that it spells the complete ruin of any city; equally, 
excellence in those who guard us is the sole measure of good government 
and of happiness. So if we, for our part, are making our guards true guards, 
who least of all threaten harm to the city, whereas that critic of ours just 
wants to make some collection of farmers happy, as if they were feasters at 
a communal banquet, not members of a city – well, it’s something else he’s 
talking about, not a city.32
Of course potters, farmers and shoemakers in Callipolis won’t ‘recline 
on couches, let to right…, drinking and feasting to their hearts’ content’, 
since such things are anyway mostly the preserve of the leisured class, i.e., the 
likes of ‘that critic of ours’, i.e., Adimantus,33 or his brother Glaucon. When 
Socrates says that this critic ‘just wants to make some collection of farmers 
happy, as if they were feasters at a communal banquet’, part of his point is 
that such a conception of happiness is worthy only of farmers – or potters, 
or shoemakers, or anyone else lacking a proper education.34 In other words, 
Adimantus and Glaucon and their sort ought to know better; as co-legis-
30. IV, 419e9-10.
31. Or should this be ‘the city’, despite the absence of the deinite article in the Greek 
(421a6)? It would certainly harm the irst city if its members stopped cooperating, and doing 
what they are meant to do. But then they won’t have ‘elaborate robes, … gold’, etc. to corrupt 
them, any more than the Callipolitan guards will.
32. 420d6-421b4.
33. Adimantus it was who made the point being criticized.
34. hat is, farmers, potters and shoemakers who grow up in any ordinary (‘usual’) city?
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lators for the new city, the brothers need to recognise that the leisured life 
they think ‘usual’ is no more suitable or happy-making for those whose role 
it is to ight for the city – as they have done, with distinction35 – than it 
would be for those destined to be farmers or potters or shoemakers. Indeed, 
as Socrates says, it is considerably less suitable for the military class, when 
judged in terms of the damage done to the city. But what matters for present 
purposes is that the passage just cited clearly shows that the producers of 
Callipolis are expected to stick to their roles as much as the guards and the 
rulers are expected to stick to theirs, on pain of their ceasing to be proper 
parts of a city.36 But that we surely know in any case, if Callipolis is a just 
city (as it is claimed to be), and if justice in the city is (as it will turn out to 
be) a matter of ‘each single individual … doing the job that is his own …’. 
he producers will still apparently be subject to ‘the many and various ordi-
nary desires, and pleasures and pains’, the sort that ‘you’ll ind especially in 
children and women and slaves, as well as in the ordinary, inferior men who 
make up the majority of those who are called free’,37 but these, according 
to Socrates’ account of moderation (sophrosune) in the city, will somehow38 
be ‘controlled … by the desires and the wisdom that reside in those who are 
fewer and superior’.39 his is not to say that the uneducated producers will 
necessarily go astray, or even be tempted to do so, but the city will have the 
power and the means to deal with them if they do. his, presumably, may 
count as ‘cleansing’ by other means.
*
So, to return to my ‘puzzle’: if the irst city passage (369a-372d) already 
provides the core of what is required for the account of justice in the city, 
why then does Socrates agree to relocate the search for justice to a diferent 
city, under diferent conditions – and (we can now add) conditions that will 
at best only allow an approximation to justice as it might be discovered in the 
city that is being let behind? Given that the whole (oicial) purpose of the 
inquiry is to ind an appropriate account of justice in the soul, it would hardly 
be far-fetched to suppose that the explanation of this move has something to 
do with the sort of account of justice in the soul that is derivable, by the 
agreed method of analogy,40 from that of justice in the city in the two cases; 
35. See I, 367e-368a.
36.  his is a partial paraphrase of the di cult lines 421b2-3, the translation of which 
above makes the best of the text printed in Simon Slings’s Oxford text.
37. IV, 439b9-c3.
38. Presumably, through laws established by the rulers and enforced by the guards in their 
internal policing role.
39. 431c10-d2; cf. IX, 590d4-6.
40. ‘he agreed method of analogy’: see 368c-369b.
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and plainly, the account of justice in the soul that is derivable, and derived, 
in this way in the case of Callipolis is not so derivable in the case of the irst 
city. If there is no hierarchy among the inhabitants of the irst city, neither 
can there be any among the parts of the souls of its citizens.41 Indeed, insofar 
as the division of the soul into parts in the Republic is established on the 
basis that the soul can be in conlict with itself, the absence even of potential 
conlict between the inhabitants of the irst city42 makes it unlikely that a 
soul constructed by analogy with them43 would have parts at all; instead, it 
would be host to a collection of diferent aspects, all contributing harmo-
niously to the whole.
hese claims clearly need leshing out. Talking about Callipolis, Socrates 
observes that there must be ‘the same kinds and dispositions [i.e., the 
wisdom-loving, the spirited, and the ‘money-loving]’ – in us as there are in 
the city’:
I don’t imagine they could have got there from anywhere else. It would be ri-
diculous to suppose that spiritedness in cities doesn’t originate in individual 
citizens – who do actually get the credit for it, as for example in hrace or 
Scythia, or pretty generally in the northern regions; and there could hardly 
be any other source for the love of learning that would be associated especial-
ly with our region, or for the love of money one would attribute most of all 
to the Phoenicians and the inhabitants of Egypt.44
Just as the spiritedness, love of wisdom and love of money that supposedly 
characterize diferent races must derive from the possession of the same 
characteristics by their members, so the characteristics of the three diferent 
‘kinds of natures’45 that form the hierarchy of Callipolis, or of any city like 
it,46 must derive from their possession by individuals with those ‘kinds of 
natures’.47 he analogy with diferent races makes it look, at irst sight, as 
if each of the three dispositions, spiritedness, love of wisdom and love of 
money are being assigned separately to the three Callipolitan classes. But 
this of course is not the case: the members of all three classes must possess all 
41. ‘[A] just man won’t difer at all from a just city in respect of the form itself, justice, that 
they have in them’ (IV, 435b1-2). See further below.
42.  ‘Even of potential conlict’: the irst city, ater all, is supposed to contain all those 
elements that make up a city; cooperation is one of those elements, discord is not.
43. hat Socrates himself does not apply the analogy in this way may be put down in the 
irst instance to the fact that his account of the irst city is cut short. But see further below.
44. IV, 435d9-436a3.
45. 435b5 gene phuseon.
46. Callipolis, ater all, is supposed to be a model for the reform (i.e., the cleansing) of 
cities in general; a city will – if Callipolis is the model – not count as reformed or cleansed 
unless it possesses the same ordered hierarchy.
47.  Cf. Narcy 2014 p.18: ‘Ce que fait apparaître la façon dont procède Socrate pour 
déinir la justice, c’est qu’entre l’âme tripartite et la cité tripartite il y a plus qu’une analogie: 
une corrélation.’
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three ‘kinds and dispositions’ together (just to diferent degrees), or else the 
job of selection would be divinely easy, and the task of educating the citizens 
so much simpler. And this is what gives rise to the division of the soul into 
three parts or elements. Glaucon has no di culty in seeing that the city’s 
qualities must derive from its citizens’. ‘But’, Socrates continues,
what is di cult to see is whether we perform each of these three activities 
with the same thing, or with three things, one for each – do we learn with 
one element in us, feel anger with another and use some third element for 
desiring the pleasures of nourishment, procreation and everything related to 
these? Or in each of these cases, as we set ourselves in motion, are we acting 
with the whole soul? hat’s the question it will be di cult to settle properly.48
As I have said, and as is well known, Socrates goes on to settle it by 
arguing from the possibility of conlict within the soul, between appetite 
and reason, and spirit and appetite. Now by the principle that the character 
of a whole with parts (a city, for example) must derive from the character of 
the parts, the apparently unqualiied unity of the irst city ought to derive 
from a similar unity in the souls of its inhabitants. In relation to the irst city, 
then, the argument for the division of the soul will have no application. It can 
work, insofar as it works at all, in the context of Callipolis because the souls 
of the citizens, while ordered, and just insofar as they are properly ordered, 
are only contingently so, as a result either of education and training or, in 
the case of the producers, of control by the guards; internal conlict remains 
always a possibility. Indeed, in the case of the producers, their desires may be 
out of kilter with their beliefs even if they do not act on those desires, and this 
is all that is required by the argument that claims to separate of the rational 
from the appetitive part of the soul.49 he citizens of the irst city, too, will 
think, get angry, be thirsty, and so on, and no doubt it will be appropriate to 
think of these as distinct soul-functions,50 but insofar as those functions will 
never be in conlict (given that the soul in each case is as uniied as the city 
is), there will be every reason to think of them as being performed ‘with the 
same thing’ rather than ‘with three things [or elements], one for each’; it is 
‘the whole soul’ that acts in each case.51
his chimes with a passage in the Sophist, in which Socrates suggests 
48. 436a8-b4.
49. See 439c.
50. Represented, perhaps, on the city side of the analogy, by the non-citizen labourers (see 
text to n.10 above)? 
51. he terms used here are of course borrowed from 436a8-b4, cited just above. here 
might be other, diferent ways of describing the relationship between diferent aspects of a 
partless soul, but this is the one Socrates ofers us. ‘he whole soul’, I suppose, would include 
its appetitive aspects (which are no less aspects of the soul than the labourers are of the 
city, being its pleroma, ‘making up its complement’, II, 371e6, even though ‘[their] share in 
intellectual qualities is not quite enough for it to be worth making them partners’, d10-e1).
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that internal conlicts typically occur in souls of people that are ‘in poor 
condition’ (phlauros echontes). ‘Well now,’ he says, ‘in a soul, when people 
are in poor condition, don’t we observe beliefs disagreeing with desires, 
anger with pleasures, reason with pains, indeed all of these with each other?’ 
(Sophist 228b2-4).52 In the Republic the guards and the rulers, at least, are not 
presently in poor condition, but if things go wrong for the city they might 
be – just like the rest of us: the parts of soul argument as a whole is framed 
in terms of common experience.53 But that does not mean that human souls 
have to be like that, or in other words that that is the natural human condi-
tion. One is reminded, in this context, of the striking passage in Book X 
where ater ofering an argument for the immortality of the soul, Socrates 
ofers the following commentary:
It’s not easy for something to be timeless, if it’s a composite of many elements 
and they haven’t been put together in the most beautiful way, which is what 
appeared to us to be the case with the soul [sc. (especially) in Book IV]… 
Well, that the soul is immortal will follow both from our argument just now, 
and from other arguments; but as for seeing the kind of thing it truly is, 
one mustn’t look at it as we are looking at it now, crippled by its association 
with the body and other things that harm it. Rather, we must use rational 
relection to examine it properly, as it is when it’s puriied from such things, 
and if we do so suiciently well, we will ind it to be something far more 
beautiful, and gain a far clearer insight into things like justice and injustice, 
and everything else we have talked about on the present occasion. As it 
is, what we have said about it describes truly enough the way it presently 
appears; yet to have viewed it in that condition makes us like people who see 
the sea-dwelling Glaucus: they see him, but can’t any longer easily make out 
his original nature – the old parts of his body have been broken of or been 
worn away by the waves, mutilated out of all recognition, while others have 
attached themselves in the form of shells and seaweed and rocks, so that he 
resembles any kind of beast more than he does his old natural self. hat is the 
condition in which we’re seeing the soul, too, beset by countless sources of 
harm. But we must turn our gaze elsewhere, Glaucon… [to] the soul’s love 
of wisdom – relecting on the things it touches on, the sorts of company it 
strives for, akin as it is to the divine and immortal, that which always is, and 
what it might become if the whole of it applied itself to such things, and this 
impulse lited it clean out of the sea in which it is now … hen one would 
see whether its true nature is to contain many kinds within it, or only one [or 
52. he translation is from Rowe 2015; in a footnote, I comment ‘Such internal “disa-
greement” in the soul is treated, in Book IV of the Republic, as the basis of an argument for 
dividing the soul into three forms or parts; if that argument were starting from what Socrates 
says here in the Sophist, would the division only apply in the case of souls “in poor condition”?’
53.  Beginning with that observation of Socrates’ at 435d9-e2, that ‘there are the same 
kinds and dispositions in us as individuals (en hekastoi … hemon) as there are in the city’.
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‘whether it is complex (polueides) or uniform (monoeides)], or exactly how it 
may be…54
It cannot be said that love of wisdom is the most prominent characte-
ristic of the irst city’s inhabitants. In fact, for all that Socrates tells us about 
them, one might suppose that they have few if any intellectual interests at 
all. he immediate purpose of citing this passage here is twofold: irst, that 
it provides clear conirmation of Socrates’ highly qualiied attitude towards 
the Book IV analysis of the soul; and second, that it provides what one might 
call a conveniently commentated example of what he may have in mind 
when he calls some x a ‘true’ x, as he calls his irst city the ‘true’ city. And the 
description of Glaucus its well enough, mutatis mutandis, with the city that 
succeeds this ‘true’ one: ‘the old parts of his body … broken of or … worn 
away by the waves, mutilated out of all recognition’, to be replaced by ‘others 
in the form of shells and seaweed and rocks, so that he resembles any kind of 
beast more than he does his old natural self ’. he idea of parts being replaced 
decidedly does not it, but then, given that Socrates will immediately raise 
the possibility that the true soul might be monoeides, contain only a single 
kind, it is not relevant to the analogy in its original application either. he 
overlay of ‘shells and seaweed and rocks’ is represented, in the case of the 
second city of Book II, not only by the things that Glaucon insists on adding 
to the irst (and are so added in real life: ‘couches, tables and other furniture, 
sauces too, perfumes, incense, prostitutes and pastries, all of them in every 
variety available… painting and embroidery,… gold and ivory and everything 
like that’),55 but also the extra territory to accommodate the additional inha-
bitants these will entail, and then the army that will be needed to acquire that 
extra territory.
*
According to the majority of modern interpreters, the Republic (speci-
ically, Book IV) marks the point at which Plato abandoned the distinctive 
Socratic psychology that is entailed by his intellectualist theory of action.56 
If the argument advanced in the preceding sections is correct, such an inter-
pretation becomes unviable. he Plato of the Republic does not abandon the 
Socratic view of the soul as a naturally uniied whole; rather, it combines that 
view with another, of the soul as it is when it has come to be ‘in poor condi-
tion’, i.e., as divided, with its ‘beliefs disagreeing with desires, anger with plea-
sures, reason with pains, indeed all of these with each other’ (to borrow the 
54. R. X, 611b5-612a3.
55. II, 373a2-7.
56. Cf. Narcy 2014 p.18: ‘Il est classique de voir dans cette tripartition de l’âme le moment 
où Platon se détourne de l’intellectualisme socratique vers une psychologie plus complexe, et 
plus réaliste’.
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language of the Sophist). his is soul as implicitly introduced by, and resem-
bling, the ‘feverish’ city, before the imposition of philosophical control,57 
and as such, if the soul-city analogy is to hold, it will itself be a product of the 
same (‘luxurious’) conditions that cause fever in the city. My interpretation 
here intersects nicely with Michel Narcy’s:
Pas de justice, donc, dans la cité qui n’est pas réformée,58 dans cette cité en 
proie à la ièvre et couverte de furoncles. Rappelons-nous que dans cette cité, 
le thumoeides n’est à l’origine que l’un de ces furoncles: c’est le tempérament 
de ces hommes introduits dans la cité pour lui permettre les conquêtes dont 
elle a besoin et empêcher les empiètements dont elle est menacée. Si l’on 
prend à la lettre l’analogie âme-cité, il faut en conclure que le thumos, lui 
aussi, s’introduit dans l’âme à la faveur des désirs qui, en elle, outrepassent les 
besoins naturels. Aussi longtemps que les habitants de la cité naturelle [i.e., 
the irst city] n’ont pas plus de désirs que de besoins, il est probable, si l’ana-
logie homme-cité est exacte, qu’ils n’ont pas de thumos. En d’autres termes, 
l’âme n’est pas plus tripartite de nature que ne l’est la cité, et si l’on réléchit 
que, dans la cité réformée qu’imagine Socrate, les dirigeants sont issus d’une 
sélection parmi les gardiens, il est loisible de penser que la raison, homologue 
dans l’âme des dirigeants dans la cité, suppose elle aussi l’éducation du thu-
mos, sa transformation, d’impétuosité potentiellement violente, en force mo-
rale. L’âme tripartite paraît ainsi tout aussi artiicielle, aussi éloignée en tout 
cas de sa nature première, que la cité juste est éloignée de la cité naturellement 
saine, la vraie cité.
his difers from my own conclusions in just two respects. First, while 
there is a sense in which the ‘reformed’ tripartite soul may be artiicial (it 
is, at any rate, the product of an education imposed from the outside), the 
unreformed tripartite soul – soul as it surfaces, briely, in and among the 
arguments for tripartition itself – is on my interpretation rather the product 
of decay, and of neglect, especially of its capacity for reason. Second, to infer 
from the city-soul analogy, in the way Narcy suggests, that the inhabitants of 
the irst city lack thumos is surely (I say) to push the analogy too far. If the 
thumoeides appears in a negative light in the unreformed city and the corres-
ponding soul, it evidently has positive aspects to it too, which do not depend 
on education and which Socrates might surely want to attribute to a soul in 
good as well as to one in bad condition: thus for example in Book IV thumos 
turns out to be ‘a natural ally for the reasoning element, unless it is corrupted 
by a bad upbringing’.59 I would prefer to say that thumos only becomes treated 
as a separate part of the soul, or treatable as if it were a separate part, in the 
57.  Michel Narcy (Narcy 2014 p.6, referring to Adam 1902) notes that Callipolis is, 
strictly, Socrates’ third city, the second being the unreformed, ‘luxurious’ city insisted on by 
Glaucon – in which, by Socrates’ lights, there will be no justice (Narcy 2014 p.19).
58. I.e., the second city (see preceding note).
59. 441a2-3.
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context of the second city and its reformed counterpart, Callipolis. Similarly 
with reason, and with appetite.60 he irst city, so peremptorily dismissed by 
Glaucon – and by some modern interpreters – as it only for pigs, ofers a 
picture of a city, and by implication of a soul, that possesses the unity appro-
priate to a ‘true’ city and to the soul as it ‘truly’ is. he passage that introduces 
that city thus fully deserves to be described as ‘key’, as in the title of this essay, 
for it quietly61 tells us how to read the following ive and a half books: as an 
account of a beautiful city whose beauty is nevertheless qualiied, insofar as 
it only approximates to the beauty of the city ‘in nature’.62 Not only that, but 
even more quietly it gives us the irst of several hints that despite the argu-
ments of Book IV we still need to consider both ‘whether [the soul’s] true 
nature is to contain many kinds within it, or only one, or exactly how it may 
be’,63 and, in the same connection, whether the account of justice ofered, 
there in Book IV, genuinely captures the true nature of justice.64
60. On appetite, see notes 50 and 51 above. 
61. Plato’s ‘quietness’ about his strategy here I explain by reference to the kind of audience 
he means to address in the irst instance – an audience (I propose) that would include the likes 
of Glaucon, whose intervention sparks Socrates’ shit from irst to second and third cities. See 
Rowe 2016.
62. See Narcy 2014, p.8: ‘la société décrite par Socrate [i.e. the irst] est une société qui 
doit tout à la nature … Il s’agit toujours d’une société qui vit à l’état de nature: nous sommes 
aux antipodes de Rousseau, aux antipodes aussi de Protagoras, mais ce que nous lisons ici, c’est 
la version socratico-platonicienne de l’état de nature.’
63. X, 612a3-4 (cited above).
64. his is not to deny that what is described in Book IV is a sort of justice. On degrees of 
justice and the other virtues in the Republic, see Rowe 2013; also, importantly, Sedley 2013. 
Sedley recognises ‘the recurrence, at the heart of the Republic, of Socratic intellectualism’, 
while at the same time taking a rather diferent view from mine on the question ‘how Socratic 
intellectualism can [Sedley’s own italics] remain true [i.e., for Plato], at a point in [his] work 
where tripartition gives every appearance of having superseded it’ (p.85).
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